# J.J. McCarthy's Real Odds of Becoming a Starter > Held to a multi-season standard, McCarthy's odds of becoming a good NFL starter are about 1 in 10. His first Giants games doubled them, from a low base. Here's how first seasons like his usually play out. By Cody Bakken · 2026-11-13 · https://codybakken.com/writing/vikings-mccarthy-real-odds/ *Part of an ongoing analysis of the Vikings offense ([project hub](/projects/vikings/)).* *Data through week 9 of 2026.* **Bottom line.** 1. First seasons as rough as McCarthy's 2025 rarely turn into starting careers. Of 16 first-year starters that bad since 2015, 2 had even one average season by year 3. 2. Held to a multi-season standard, his chance of becoming a good starter is about 9%. His most likely outcome is a backup or fringe starter (65%). 3. His 77 Giants dropbacks roughly doubled those odds, from a low base. His strong finish to 2025 adds nothing to the forecast. 4. A new coach by itself doesn't turn young QBs around. Goff's and Lawrence's breakouts looked nothing alike, and McCarthy's Giants situation matches neither. McCarthy's first 3 games as a Giant came in at +0.10 adjusted EPA per dropback. His 2025 season in Minnesota was −0.23. That's 77 dropbacks, which is a small sample, and it was enough to restart the argument about whether the Vikings gave up too early. That argument depends on a base rate that rarely comes up: how often a first season like his turns into a starting career. So I built it, plus a forecast that updates after every game he plays. - **Sustained good or elite starter:** 9% - **Sustained average or better:** 28% - **Backup or fringe starter:** 65% ## 1. Where a first season like his usually leads McCarthy's 2025: −0.23 opponent-adjusted EPA per dropback on 290 dropbacks, the 12th percentile of 60 first-year starters since 2015. He was 22 and the 10th overall pick. *[Chart: First-year starters who had an average-starter season by year 3. See the web version: https://codybakken.com/writing/vikings-mccarthy-real-odds/]* One in three first-year starters turns into at least an average starter. Start in the bottom quartile, where McCarthy was, and it's about one in eight. Being a first-round pick helps (2 of 7), but look at who the two were: Jared Goff and Trevor Lawrence. Both were #1 overall picks, and both took off after a coaching change, Goff from Fisher to McVay and Lawrence from Meyer to Pederson. The first-rounders who didn't make it: Josh Rosen, Dwayne Haskins, Bryce Young, Zach Wilson, Justin Fields. That's two cases. It's tempting to read them as a recipe: bad first year, new coach, breakout. Section 6 tests that. The base rate has a feedback loop in it. Half of the bottom-quartile QBs never got another 150-dropback season, so they never had the chance to post an average one. A bad first year costs a QB his starts, and losing the starts makes the bad first year look even more predictive. Some of that 13% reflects how teams behave. ## 2. Holding QBs to more than one good year The base rate above counts a QB who has a single average season. That's a low bar. Burrow, Mahomes and Allen are elite over several years, so for the forecast I required a QB to reach a tier in **at least 2 of his years 2–4**: - **Elite:** top 8 in adjusted EPA twice - **Good:** top 16 twice - **Average:** top 24 twice - **Backup or fringe:** played, but didn't qualify twice - **Out:** never got 150 dropbacks in a season again Draft slot goes in as the actual pick on a log scale, because the drop-off within the first round is steep. Those two choices cut McCarthy's good-or-elite odds from about 30% to about 10%. ## 3. The odds by tier *[Chart: Sustained tier in years 2–4. See the web version: https://codybakken.com/writing/vikings-mccarthy-real-odds/]* On 2025 alone, he looked like a bottom-quartile starter with a better draft slot: 5% good or elite, 13% average or better. Adding 77 Giants dropbacks at +0.10 moves him to 9% and 28%. The biggest shift is out of "Out": 21% → 7%. Because of the feedback loop above, that matters: he's likely to keep getting the starts most QBs in his spot lose. Only 13 of the 47 QBs in the cohort reached a sustained good or elite tier: Mahomes, Allen, Lamar Jackson, Purdy, Watson, Tagovailoa and Goff at elite; Herbert, Burrow, Hurts, Wentz, Winston and Mariota at good. ## 4. Game by game *[Chart. See the web version: https://codybakken.com/writing/vikings-mccarthy-real-odds/]* Most of the climb came in December 2025, before he ever played for the Giants. From his low point after week 12 to the end of the season, his good-or-elite odds went from 1% to 8%. The Giants games added a few more points, and his third Giants game gave some back. This chart uses a slightly different model than section 3: it fits once and feeds in his year-2 play as it accumulates, which stays stable after a single game. It reads 11% where section 3 reads 9%. Treat them as the same answer. ## 5. The strong finish doesn't change the forecast McCarthy's rookie season had two halves: −0.37 adjusted EPA per dropback before week 10, −0.03 after. That looked like a QB figuring it out. Across the cohort, a jump like that from the first half to the second doesn't predict year 2 at all. Adding it to the model made the forecasts worse. His closest matches on rookie level, second-half jump, age and draft slot: *[Table. See the web version: https://codybakken.com/writing/vikings-mccarthy-real-odds/]* Two of eight became elite: Josh Allen and Lamar Jackson. Five never stuck. Haskins is the closest match overall. The late-season version of McCarthy did look different in one place. From shotgun, his throws past the first read were close to a league-average QB's. From under center, in O'Connell's play-action game, they weren't. *[Chart: McCarthy, throws past the first read, weeks 10–18 of 2025. See the web version: https://codybakken.com/writing/vikings-mccarthy-real-odds/]* ## 6. Is there a "Goff and Lawrence play"? The story people tell about Goff and Lawrence is a bad first year, a new coach, a friendlier offense, then a breakout. The Giants move looks like the same story for McCarthy. I tested both halves. **A new coach alone doesn't make young QBs better.** Among 37 first-year starters who kept playing in year 2, those with a new head coach improved by −0.02 EPA per dropback relative to those without one, once you account for how bad their first year was (95% CI −0.11 to +0.07). In the bottom half of year 1, 2 of 15 reached an average season with a new coach and 2 of 15 without. A new coach did change who kept the job: 53% of those QBs kept starting with a new coach, 27% without. **Goff and Lawrence got different things.** *[Chart: Time to throw, year 1 → year 2. See the web version: https://codybakken.com/writing/vikings-mccarthy-real-odds/]* *[Chart: Receiver quality, year 1 → year 2. See the web version: https://codybakken.com/writing/vikings-mccarthy-real-odds/]* Goff's offense got slower under McVay, and his receivers went from the 5th percentile to the 48th. Lawrence's offense got much quicker under Pederson, with receivers a little worse than the year before. What they had in common was draft slot and patience: both were #1 picks, and both got a full second season (510 and 639 dropbacks). McCarthy got a quicker offense and the starts. He also lost one of the league's best supporting casts: his receivers went from the 93rd percentile with Jefferson and Addison to the 48th with the Giants. That's the biggest drop of any QB in the cohort who changed coaches. ## So what - **Moving on was defensible by the base rates.** One in eight bottom-quartile starters had even one average season by year 3. For a team trying to win now, that's a reasonable call. It was still a bet. Had the number been 40%, it would have been premature. - **The Giants gave McCarthy the one thing Goff and Lawrence shared: the starts.** A new coach on its own hasn't helped QBs like him, and he's throwing to a much weaker group than he had in Minnesota. If he plays well with this cast, that's a stronger signal than the same numbers would have been with Jefferson. - **What to watch:** his odds after each Giants start. The chart above updates after every game, and each start puts more weight on his Giants play and less on his rookie year. **Takeaway:** a rough first season like McCarthy's is a strong negative signal. By the base rates, a team that moves on from one usually isn't giving up a future starter. The two exceptions since 2015 were #1 overall picks whose teams gave them a full second season. ## What this doesn't tell us - **47 QBs.** The intervals are wide: backup or fringe runs from 40% to 82%. - **The base rates partly measure opportunity** (section 1). Some of the QBs who lost their starts might have improved with them. - **A three-season window clips late bloomers.** Sam Darnold became a top QB in year 7. - **Tiers are adjusted EPA rank only.** No contracts, no reputation, and no front-office reasoning. Why Minnesota decided what it did isn't in the data. Method: every NFL dropback 2015–26, with opponent effects removed. First-year starter = first season with 150+ dropbacks, rookie year 2015 or later. Full analysis: [Q24](https://github.com/codybakken/vikings-analysis/tree/main/analyses/q24_mccarthy_tiers), [Q22](https://github.com/codybakken/vikings-analysis/tree/main/analyses/q22_mccarthy_timeline), [Q26](https://github.com/codybakken/vikings-analysis/tree/main/analyses/q26_coaching_change_play). Time to throw: Next Gen Stats. Data: nflverse and FTN charting (CC-BY-SA 4.0).